The War of Attrition (1969–1970) was a prolonged conflict between Israel and Egypt that began shortly after the conclusion of the Six-Day War. Sparked by Egypt's goal of reclaiming the Sinai Peninsula, the war saw Egypt attempt to weaken Israeli defenses through artillery duels, air raids, and attacks along the Suez Canal. For the most part, Israel's responses were measured retaliations, which proved ineffective in deterring further Egyptian attacks.
The direct hostilities culminated in a ceasefire agreement brokered by the United States in 1970. However, Egypt immediately violated the agreement by moving anti-aircraft missile batteries into the restricted zone along the Suez Canal. Subsequently, Egypt exploited the ceasefire period to illegally fortify its positions, laying the groundwork for the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
While these events were unfolding, the Rebbe urged Israel’s leadership to undertake decisive and proactive military action in its own defense. Relying on diplomacy, ceasefire agreements, and appeals for intervention by uninvolved nations, the Rebbe warned, would not result in peace. Rather, it would lead to conflict and anguish, and would only embolden Egypt to further aggression.
Background
By the end of the Six-Day War on June 10, 1967, Israel had conquered the entirety of the Sinai Peninsula which, until this point, had been under Egypt’s control, all the way to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was determined to regain the Sinai, and believed that the only way to do so was through military action. With his military unfit to conduct all-out war, Nasser set out to exhaust Israel through continuous low-level warfare, by conducting a war of attrition.
The hostilities of the Six-Day War had formally concluded with a June 10, 1967 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Egypt.[1] On July 1, Egypt violated the agreement, launching mortar fire at IDF positions on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. In response, Israel defended its positions and carried out a counterattack.
Israeli naval personnel celebrate their victory after an engagement with Egyptian naval forces near Rumani, 1967
Over the following months, the clashes turned into an almost-daily occurrence. A recurring sequence began to unfold. Egypt would attack Israeli positions near the Suez Canal, in the Sinai Desert, or an Israeli vessel in the Mediterranean, and Israel would respond with limited air or sea raids against Egyptian positions and supplies.
For nearly two years, Israel refrained from initiating a major offensive, sufficing instead with measured retaliatory actions, while Egypt, undeterred, persisted with sporadic attacks that steadily increased in scale.
By early 1969, Egypt began to prepare for a more significant escalation. The Egyptian government engaged in closer coordination with the Soviet Union, acquiring additional weapons and amassing over 35,000 artillery shells near the Suez Canal.[2]
Effective Deterrence
From the outbreak of hostilities in July 1967 and throughout the conflict that followed, Israel consistently appealed to the United Nations, urging it to take action to halt Egypt's aggression.[3]
In an address on Purim, March 4, 1969, the Rebbe strongly criticized this strategy, asserting that in the face of threats to Israel's safety—not to mention an active war claiming lives on a regular basis—Israel must decisively defend itself. Jewish law unequivocally prioritizes the prevention of further casualties and mandates that this goal be achieved without regards to short-term diplomatic repercussions.
The Rebbe taught that decisive, if necessary, large-scale, military action would serve as an effective deterrent against further Egyptian attacks. He referenced the Talmud, which asserts that when a person perceives an imminent threat, they are obligated to act swiftly and decisively in self-defense, before an actual attack occurs. As the Talmud states: “If someone comes to kill you, rise early to kill him first.”[4]
The Rebbe added that this approach would not only ensure Israel’s security, but would also save lives on the adversary’s side. He pointed out a subtle yet crucial distinction in the Talmud’s text:
The Talmud presents a very rational idea, it need not be accepted on faith. When someone is coming to kill you, it is not a time to lodge complaints. He must see that you “rise early to kill him.”
But the Talmud doesn't say you must actually kill him—it needn’t reach that point. When the enemy sees that you have arisen at dawn with a display of force, and are ready to act if necessary—that if they choose to strike, you will be prepared to do so first—then they won't attempt it in the first place.[5]
This is the only approach they will respect. And it is, in fact, in the best interest of the enemy, as well. If you truly seek his well-being—to avoid war and preserve his life—this is the only approach that will make him take you seriously![6]
The Rebbe contended that appealing to the United Nations would prove an ineffective means of deterring Egyptian aggression, and would only delay the necessary measures required to ensure the safety of Israel’s citizens:
When you are aware that someone is out to murder you, the solution is not to sit around and wait for every other nation to endorse your actions, or for all of the representatives at the UN to cast their votes to decide whether or not you have the right to retaliate. This is not how to address someone who is intent on murder.[7]
The Rebbe contrasted Torah's stance on the importance of decisive defensive action as the truest means to achieve enduring peace, with moral arguments that Israeli military action is is unjustifiable, in almost any instance:
They say, “You want to retaliate? Where is your sense of justice and morality?! How can you do such a thing?
“First, bring the case before the UN, where all the upstanding, moral members will gather—having first been at their places of worship, where they were taught to ‘love your fellow as yourself,’ and that when struck on one cheek, you must ‘turn the other cheek.’ Then, they will decide the status of the attacker, and you will oblige and follow their instructions…”
He referenced the oft-suggested approach of resolving conflicts through diplomatic engagement and dialogue. Highlighting the futility of attempting to reason with an aggressor intent on violence, the Rebbe elaborated:
Israeli soldier observing Suez after Operation Avuka“Excuse me, Mister Cossack, inasmuch as you wish to kill Jews, you should be aware that this violates the UN Charter. You must first call a meeting and request permission. True, you attacked yesterday without permission—it's too late for that—but you can change your ways from now on!”[8]
You can lodge complaints, send delegates, and engage in endless talk—all of which have been tried at the expense of so many lives. Not only did these methods fail to remedy the situation, they exacerbated it. The enemy sees that they can strike as often as they’d like with impunity.[6]
The Rebbe emphasized that such an outcome would be detrimental to the world as a whole, with significant consequences extending beyond Israel. He cautioned:
The results are inevitable: they won't stop at the Jews. Once they become accustomed to attacking Jews with impunity, they will turn their aggression toward non-Jews as well.[8]
Temporary Ceasefire
On March 8, 1969, Egypt launched its first large-scale assault on Israeli positions along the Bar-Lev Line, which had been constructed after the Six-Day War. From that point onward, both nations engaged in more frequent and larger-scale clashes, which continued for over a year.
In June 1970, the US proposed a ceasefire plan,[9] which included the establishment of a military standstill zone along the Suez Canal—“no major troop movements and no new installations in the combat zone”[10]—and a 90-day ceasefire that would pave the way for peace talks under United Nations auspices. Israel expressed its willingness to accept the ceasefire and declared itself willing to consider withdrawal from some of the territories it had captured.[11]
The Rebbe firmly opposed this proposal and, in an address delivered on August 1, 1969, detailed the dangers of Israel committing to bring military activities in the Sinai to a halt for ninety days, in exchange for the promise of beginning peace talks:
What is the point of a 90-day ceasefire? Let them decide: If they are truly prepared to make peace, let them sign a peace treaty within twenty-four hours, and then the war will end forever!
However, the reality is, as everyone knows: the sole motive for seeking a ninety-day ceasefire is to gain time to construct new fortifications along the Suez Canal, and to stockpile them with new weapons—which are already prepared and waiting in Libya, France, or Russia, awaiting the opportunity to be transferred to the front lines. At present, they cannot transfer the materials due to Israel’s non-stop shelling over the past three months—which is specifically intended to prevent the construction of fortifications and the delivery of weapons. So they need a ninety-day suspension of hostilities, and they already have a pretext as to why they won’t honor the terms of the standstill agreement.
As such, it is utterly irrational to enter this agreement at this time. Everything invested over the past three months will be lost—millions of dollars (in defensive actions and fortifications), but most importantly, the many lives lost![12]
On another occasion, the Rebbe demonstrated that insisting on a ceasefire as the first step toward peace is misguided:
Over time, there have been many wars around the world, and when the fighting parties wanted peace, they achieved it without a prior ceasefire.[13]
The Rebbe further emphasized the predictability of the ceasefire’s outcome:
It is unrealistic to think that the Egyptians would not use the ceasefire period to fortify their positions along the canal, especially since this has been Nasser’s objective for years. He prepared for war even during times of economic and military instability. How much more so now, when fortifying these positions poses neither an economic nor a military burden—on the contrary…
Yet, Israel relies on his assurances that he will adhere to the terms of the standstill agreement, despite his long history of demonstrating that written agreements do not bind him—he will do as he pleases.[14]
In an August 3, 1970 letter to Aharon Yariv, the head of AMAN, the IDF's Military Intelligence, the Rebbe detailed how Egypt could easily circumvent the terms of the standstill agreement during the ceasefire:
It is obvious that Egyptian promises not to use this time to strengthen and fortify areas on the western bank of the canal, etc., are meaningless, since there is no entity to ensure compliance. Especially as Egypt will rely on the agreement’s distinction between “defense” and “offense” as a pretext, for anything done in the name of defense is allowed. In this regard, they can bring in any materials, under the claim that they are being brought as part of the effort to resettle the ruined cities along the western bank of the canal [which is allowed under the treaty].
All the necessary materials have already been prepared—some of it in Libya and others on ships located nearby—and the experts are either already on-site, or can arrive there within a few hours.
Surely, no one expects that once the peace talks begin, the opposing side will willingly forgo the rights they presently have to fortify their positions, etc. And if such a naïve person exists, then he is completely out of touch, putting it diplomatically.[15]
UN Peacekeeping Force
Pointing to numerous precedents, the Rebbe maintained that the presence of an international force tasked with policing a ceasefire agreement did not, in any way, ensure compliance with the commitments, nor did such a presence reduce the security risks involved. He pointed out that, historically, these forces had consistently failed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, citing several examples:[16]
In May 1948, following the commencement of Israel’s War of Independence, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established to monitor ceasefires and oversee armistice agreements.[17] However, as the Rebbe noted, this force had been ineffective in preventing violations of those agreements.[18]
UNEF soldiers in the Sinai 1957
Similarly, after the Suez Crisis of 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed in the Egyptian-owned Sinai Peninsula to monitor the cessation of hostilities and serve as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces, aiming to prevent further conflicts in the region. In the lead-up to the Six-Day War of 1967, Egyptian President Nasser demanded the immediate withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai Peninsula. The United Nations swiftly complied with this request, and UNEF forces were withdrawn.[19]
The Rebbe identified an achilleas heel in the very structure of UN peacekeeping missions: Under UN regulations, the presence of any peacekeeping force is contingent upon the consent of the host government,[20] undermining the deterrent effect of the peacekeeping force, and rendering such forces ineffective as a reliable safeguard against aggression or ceasefire violations.
He highlighted that this flaw had been demonstrated a short time earlier with the very same parties, and would inevitably manifest again in the future:
Nasser agreed to allow [the United Nations peacekeeping force] to be stationed in Egypt, but he had arranged from the outset that they would leave whenever he ordered them to—and that is precisely what happened. He has already tested their compliance and has seen that they obeyed him. Why would you expect him to act any differently in the future?![6]
Ceasefire
On August 7, 1970, Israel and Egypt signed a ceasefire agreement in which it was explicitly prohibited to “change the military status quo” or “construct any new military installations” within the 31-mile-deep ceasefire zone.[9][21]
However, within hours of the ceasefire taking effect, Egypt had moved surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems into the restricted area along the western bank of the Suez Canal, initiating the construction of a formidable anti-aircraft defense network. On August 8, Israel submitted its first formal protest to the United States, seeking intervention against these violations. In the following weeks, multiple protests were lodged, urging action to address the increasing infractions. The protests were supported by photographic evidence showing newly-constructed SAM sites and military equipment deployed within the standstill zone. The United States demurred, stating that it lacked strong enough evidence to present a strong case to Egypt. Furthermore, they believed that Israel maintained significant military superiority over Egypt, allowing room for more diplomatic tolerance on the ceasefire violations.[22]
In September, Time magazine reported that the “U.S.’s detailed reconnaissance pictures showed that the 36 SA-2 missiles sneaked into the cease-fire zone constitute only the first line of the most massive antiaircraft system ever created.”[23]
By October 1970, approximately 150 SAM sites had been established in the area—nearly double the number present at the start of the ceasefire.[22]
In an address on August 22, the Rebbe asserted that the only appropriate response to Egypt's violation of the ceasefire would be immediate military action to neutralize the emerging threat posed by the renewed buildup of Egypt's military capabilities. He described a set of circumstances that had emerged as “a miraculous opportunity” for Israel to defend itself, and criticized the Israeli leadership for failing to act:
Behold the wonder: The first time the ceasefire conditions were violated—immediately after it began—with the Egyptians transporting military supplies to the Suez Canal, they did so openly. They could have easily concealed the weapons with a few branches or a white cloth, later claiming they were for officers' dining tables, or that the vehicles carried construction materials to repair damaged cities along the canal (after all, the ceasefire agreement did not prohibit repairs). But G-d performed a miracle—they acted openly, enabling the violations to be photographed and sent to the United States.
And yet, despite the fact that those responsible were fully aware of it, nothing was done, and the Egyptians continued to fortify and reorganize—an outcome that was entirely predictable. The only logical response—bombing and destroying the equipment, missiles, and fortifications the Egyptians had constructed—was never taken. Instead, after several days, it was announced that a protest had been filed with Washington. Since then, diplomatic negotiations have been conducted, at most accompanied by threats that Israel will not participate in peace talks. Meanwhile, Egypt has not ceased fortifying its positions. If this continues, even the Phantom jets that Israel is working to procure will not be able to penetrate them![24]
Expressing his concern and exasperation over the Israeli government's failure to heed his repeated warnings about such foreseeable security threats, the Rebbe emotionally invoked a verse from the Haftarah of that week:
"Why, when I came, was no one there? Why, when I called, would none respond?"[25]
In an August 20 letter to Ariel Sharon, commander of the IDF's Southern Command, the Rebbe detailed the weaknesses and repercussions of lodging official complaints with the United States:
Although I am not generally a pessimist, one cannot ignore the reality that if, G‑d forbid, things continue along their current natural course, the enemy will continue to strengthen and fortify its position across the Suez Canal. Despite all of Israel’s official protestations, the enemy is certainly using every day to reinforce their military strength, acquire the best weapons, etc.
As for Israel’s complaints about Egypt’s broken promises (which no one seriously believed would be honored in the first place…), these will continue to be dragged out for as long as possible, and eventually, a status quo will be established, based on the facts on the ground at the end of negotiations. Consequently, in any future negotiations for peace terms, Israel will find itself at a severe disadvantage, as the state of security will have shifted dramatically from the day the ceasefire began to the day negotiations conclude.[26]
Shifting the Balance of Power
In an August 24, 1971 letter to the Director of Israel’s Military Intelligence (AMAN), Aharon Yariv, the Rebbe illustrated the ramifications of the ceasefire, analyzing its impact on Israel's strategic position and the resulting shift in the balance of power between Egypt and Israel:
Within the first 24 hours of the ceasefire, the Egyptians began deploying new missile systems on the western bank—and continued doing so without any meaningful Israeli response, other than verbal protests. These protests had no realistic expectation of changing the situation except, perhaps, securing minor additional military aid from the US, which in any case fell far short of the Soviet arms pouring into Egypt.
The balance of power has steadily shifted, and it has become increasingly clear that American supplies could not match the volume or quality of Soviet aid.
What is particularly painful is that a similar situation has already occurred twice before—with the withdrawal from the canal in 1956 and the offer to return the “occupied territories” in 1967—yet these moves failed to shift the attitudes of Egypt, the Soviet Union, or even the United States in Israel’s favor. Instead, they were interpreted as signs of weakness on the part of those in Israel who determine its policy in relations with Egypt, the Arab world, the USSR, and the United States.
In our imperfect world, weakness invites pressure, not mercy. But despite the clear lessons of history, the same approach persists, not only in words but also in actions, accompanied by attempts to pacify [Israeli] public opinion with implausible explanations. Examples include the belief that Israel has meaningful allies among world governments, or that the African nations Israel has assisted will support Israel in the UN, or the claim recently made in military circles that the IDF is now much stronger than it was during the Six-Day War. While this statement is true in itself, it entirely ignores the core issue: The balance of Israeli forces compared to those across the canal is significantly worse today than it was in 1967, particularly in manpower, as the Soviet military presence in Egypt now far exceeds what it was in 1967, both in quantity and quality.
It is true that, miraculously, Egypt has not yet signed a piece of paper formalizing the agreement—a document no one expects them to honor anyway. Therefore, the situation remains in limbo. However, as mentioned earlier, it requires serious reflection whether this limbo strengthens the position of the Israeli troops on the eastern side of the canal, or the position of the Egyptian troops on the western side.
By nature, I am not a pessimist, and I sincerely seek to identify encouraging changes year by year. However, no matter how strong the desire, one must never deceive oneself—especially on matters of such grave importance.[27]
The concerns laid out in the Rebbe’s letter to Yariv (which also included warnings that the Bar Lev Line would not provide adequate defense against an Egyptian attack), proved accurate, as borne out by the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, which stated explicitly that such persistence was the root of the Israeli failure in the Yom Kippur War in October, 1973.[28]
Aftermath
The War of Attrition resulted in the deaths of a staggering 1,500 Israelis and many thousands of Egyptians.[29]
While the Rebbe tried to call public attention to the devastating toll being wrought by the protracted conflict, Israel’s media largely ignored the story.[30]
In the subsequent years, diplomatic efforts to achieve peace between Israel and Egypt were unproductive. Meanwhile, Egypt focused on bolstering its military capabilities, particularly along the Suez Canal. The deployment of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems in this region provided Egypt with substantial air defense cover that played a crucial role in Egypt’s surprise attack on Israel at the start of the Yom Kippur War, in October 1973, significantly impeding the operational effectiveness of the Israeli Air Force, and leading to heavy IAF losses.[31]
War between Aram and Achav is told to us, so as not to repeat the mistake. Just like the kid in cheder that heard the story of yosef the fact heard the story the next year asks why making the same mistake. Sicha, 13 Tammuz, 5729 - Audio
The same problems by the Six-Day War as in the time of Achav. Sicha, Purim, 5730 - Audio
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