The Sinai Campaign - 1956
Overview
On October 29, 1956, Israel, in coordination with the United Kingdom and France, launched a military offensive against Egypt in the Egyptian-controlled Sinai Peninsula. This action was in response to Egypt’s nationalization of the British- and French-operated Suez Canal and its blockade of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. The joint Israeli-British-French operation aimed to reclaim control of the canal and secure critical shipping routes.
Although the operation achieved military success, it quickly provoked significant international backlash, particularly from the United States. Under mounting pressure, the invading forces agreed to a ceasefire just days after the operation began, and subsequently withdrew their forces without achieving the operation's objectives.
The Rebbe strongly criticized Israel’s withdrawal, describing the Sinai Peninsula as a strategic asset vital to Israel’s security needs, and the withdrawal as a danger to life and limb, pointing to flaws in the justifications provided by Israel's leadership.
Background
On September 5, 1955, in response to an anti-terrorist operation conducted by Israel in Egyptian-controlled southern Gaza, Egypt blocked Israeli access to the Straits of Tiran and its airspace.[1] The Straits of Tiran are a vital maritime route connecting Israel to East Africa and Asia, and their closure significantly restricted Israel’s access to these regions as well as to oil from the Persian Gulf, threatening its economic and security interests.
On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the joint British-French enterprise that had operated the Suez Canal since its construction. Immediately following this move, Egypt closed the canal to Israeli vessels. With all land trade routes blocked by neighboring Arab countries, this closure effectively severed Israel's connections to East Africa, Asia, and the Persian Gulf.
Israel was not the only country affected by this decision—the canal was a critical route for Middle Eastern oil supplies to reach European countries, making safe passage through the canal essential to their energy security. The United Kingdom and France were particularly affected, as the British government and French investors were the primary shareholders in the Suez Canal Company. Both nations also relied on the route in order to maintain reliable access to their African colonies, making Egypt’s seizure of the canal a direct threat to their geopolitical and economic interests.
To secure their interests and prevent further disruptions, Britain and France decided to retake control of the canal through military intervention. Israel joined the operation, seeing an opportunity to capture the strategic Sinai Peninsula, end the Egyptian blockade of the waterways, and secure its border with Egypt.
On October 29, 1955, in coordination with the United Kingdom and France, Israel launched a military offensive against Egypt in the Egyptian-controlled Sinai Peninsula. Within several days, the IDF captured nearly the entire Sinai Desert, while British and French forces landed at the canal, cutting off the Egyptian army from the canal zone.
Despite the operation’s success, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom faced international pressure, primarily from the United States, to abort the mission without achieving their goal of controlling the canal. Between November 2 and 10, the United Nations General Assembly adopted seven resolutions, calling for a ceasefire and the establishment of a UN Emergency Force to oversee its implementation and facilitate Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai.[2]
On November 6, under intense political and economic pressure, the British government ordered its forces to cease fighting, despite military assessments indicating that the operation had succeeded more quickly than anticipated and that full control of the canal could be achieved within the next 24 hours.
Under the threat of severe sanctions, the United Kingdom and France withdrew their forces from the canal in December. By March 1957, Israel, facing similar pressure, withdrew its forces from Sinai and Gaza, in exchange for Egypt affirming their commitment to allow free and uninterrupted navigation through the waterways for vessels sailing under any nation’s flag.[3]
Despite this commitment, however, Egypt continued to deny Israeli passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran in the years that followed.[4]
Assessing the Withdrawal
In the years that followed, the Rebbe criticized Israel’s decision to withdraw from Sinai. He argued that once Israel had secured control of an asset which was vital to Israel’s security, a retreat constitutes a major danger to its security. Such a move, he explained, would only invite further external pressure that could undermine Israel's ability to defend itself, and signal to its enemies that their tactics were effective.[5]
Furthermore, the Rebbe argued, a number of the explanations articulated by Israel’s leadership did not hold up to scrutiny: Egypt had never had a rightful claim to the canal in the first place; the pressure from the United States was primarily lip service to appease domestic and international audiences; and, most urgently: Rather than leading to peace, the withdrawal would lead to further conflict.
Springboard for Subsequent Conflicts
This withdrawal bolstered Egypt’s standing as a leader in the Arab world, enabling it to regroup and plan future attacks against Israel from this strategically vital region.
In the years following Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War, the Rebbe would emphasize that the decision to relinquish territory gained in a defensive war in an effort to appease the surrounding countries and the international community, led to further conflict:
- After the successful operation in 1956, there were some who were afraid. They argued that “we mustn’t provoke the nations,” so we must withdraw and return the conquered areas, and “if not, the results will be calamitous.”
- Unfortunately their arguments were accepted, and Israel withdrew, in exchange for a promise to speak about peace.
- In practice, we all witnessed the “peace” that resulted: Despite Nasser’s commitment to allow free passage for Israeli ships, [in 1967] he mocked the entire world and broke his promise. Instead of peace—which was the goal of the retreat—throughout the entire time the Egyptians were, in fact, preparing for another war.[6]
United States Pressure
On numerous occasions, the Rebbe criticized Israel’s government for yielding to international pressure. He stressed that the government’s foremost responsibility is to ensure the security of its citizens, regardless of U.S. pressure.
Some twenty years after the crisis, in a 1979 address, the Rebbe explained that during the Suez Canal Crisis, the United States had other priorities that led it to oppose the operation.
At the time of the Crisis, in October 1956, the Hungarian Revolution had just erupted, with the Hungarian people attempting to overthrow its Soviet-backed communist government. The United States strongly opposed Soviet military intervention in Hungary. Thus, it was politically untenable for the U.S. to support the British and French operation in the Sinai. It would appear hypocritical for the US to condemn Soviet actions in Hungary, while supporting British and French intervention in the Middle East.
Additionally, at the time, the US was heavily focused on containing the USSR’s global sphere of influence, including in the Middle East. Egyptian President Nasser was increasingly aligning with the Soviets, and the US feared that supporting the joint Israel-British-French operation could drive Nasser and other Arab nations toward the USSR, strengthening Soviet influence.
Though the United States, as a global superpower, felt compelled to speak out against the operation, the Rebbe argued, even they had not expected that Israel would actually comply:
- Several years after the first withdrawal from the Suez Canal in ‘56, when, under pressure from Washington, England, France and Israel were forced to pull back, an American general expressed his shock, asking how Israel could have listened to the U.S.?
- To which his Israeli counterpart responded, “What do you mean? You threatened us. You even specified the sanctions you’d impose!”
- The American replied: “We had no choice; we needed to issue verbal threats. But how is it that you actually withdrew?!”[7]
Lamenting the lack of confidence displayed by the Israeli government in making decisions that were vital to its security, the Rebbe added that even at the time, there were many in Israel and beyond who were aware that the United States’ opposition to Israel’s action was primarily lip service. They knew that had Israel stood strong, it would have been able to retain the gains of its “miraculous victory.” However, they could not bring themselves to stand their ground.
Repeated Misstep
The withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula after it stood under Israeli control, proved not to be an isolated incident. In the years that followed, a pattern emerged, with the Israeli government offering to return territories it had captured in defensive actions, even when such positions were vital to its security.
After the defensive actions of the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel proposed returning the Golan Heights to Syria, and the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel returned parts of the Golan Heights to Syria as part of a ceasefire agreement, and ultimately returned the Sinai, along with its huge oil reserves, to Egypt, under the Camp David Accords.
In subsequent years, the Rebbe warned of the terminal dangers of these decisions, cautioning against repeating the same mistakes:
- The same mistake that has already been made three times, costing thousands of lives, cannot be repeated.
- The IDF achieved miraculous victories—truly supernatural—in all the wars of the last three decades. Yet afterward, some, whose souls are in spiritual exile, sent messengers to all the nations, requesting that they take back what the army had just conquered. This is what occurred after the first war (1956) in the last thirty years, after the second war (1967), and after the third war (1973)![5]
Egypt’s Right to the Canal
In his 1956 speech announcing the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Egyptian President Nasser declared that Egypt rightfully owned the canal, citing the “120,000 Egyptian workmen who died” during its construction.[8]
The Rebbe noted that while Egypt formally held territorial sovereignty over the land surrounding the canal, legal control of the canal itself, as well as its practical operation, had been held by the international Suez Canal Company which had constructed it. The company was managed by stockholders who, driven by financial incentives, ensured that all ships were permitted to pass freely through the canal.
However, in 1956, Nasser had “confiscated the canal, appropriated its profits, and began exercising control over it as he saw fit,” promptly barring Israel from accessing its shipping routes.[9]
Other Mentions
Further Reading
- YouTube: Crisis in Israel-US Relations? | Lessons From The 1956 Suez Canal Crisis
- Suez Crisis - Wikipedia.
- Timeline of the Suez Crisis - Wikipedia.
- Israeli passage through the Suez Canal and Straits of Tiran - Wikipedia.
References
- ↑ Karen Rasler, William R. Thompson, Sumit Ganguly, How Rivalries End (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 38–39.
- ↑ UN General Assembly Resolutions 997-1003. Resolution 997-1000, Resolution 1001-1003.
- ↑ Suez Crisis, 1956 – U.S. Department of State Archive; The 1956 Suez Crisis as a Perfect Case for Crisis Research; The Suez Crisis of 1956 – History Learning Site; Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt – April 11, 1957.
- ↑ “Middle East: At Last, a Way Out?” TIME, August 10, 1970; “The Ben Gurion Canal: Israel’s Potential Revolutionary Alternative to Suez — Analysis.” Eurasia Review, November 17, 2023.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Address, Purim 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2 p. 39; Audio.
- ↑ Address, 20 Av, 5730. Toras Menachem vol. 61 pp. 155-156; Sichos Kodesh vol. 2 p. 460a.
- ↑ Address, 29 Iyar, 5739. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2 p. 730; Video; Audio.
- ↑ Speech by President Nasser, Alexandria – July 26, 1956; “Egypt Nationalises Suez Canal.” The Guardian, July 27, 1956.
- ↑ Address, 19 Adar, 5739. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2 p. 327; Video; Audio.