Jump to content

Aftermath of the Yom Kippur War 1974

From Enduring Peace Knowledge Base

Disengagement Agreements

Although the ceasefire officially ended the Yom Kippur War, active hostilities continued for several months.

On the Egyptian front, fighting persisted until the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian Disengagement Agreement on January 18, 1974 that outlined mutual military withdrawals and the establishment of a UN-supervised buffer zone.[1]

Israeli soldiers captured by the Syrian army on the Golan Heights.

On the Syrian front, while U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger engaged in shuttle diplomacy, frequent exchanges of fire escalated into a sustained war of attrition initiated by Syria, aimed at undermining the Israeli economy.[2] Throughout late 1973 and into 1974, Syria refused to release Israeli prisoners of war, many of whom were subjected to brutal torture or were killed in captivity.[3]

In a public address on May 11, 1974, the Rebbe lamented Israel’s restraint during the war, asserting that an early IDF advance on Damascus would have subdued Syria—thereby preventing the subsequent war of attrition, and securing the release of captured soldiers.[4]

The Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement was signed on May 31, 1974, effectively ending hostilities on the Syrian front.[5] The following day, June 1, the exchange process began, in which 65 Israeli prisoners of war held in Syria were returned—both living prisoners and bodies of those who were killed in captivity—in exchange for 408 Syrian prisoners.[6]

Aftermath

Over the course of nearly three weeks, Israel suffered approximately 2,600 fatalities, with an additional 7,250 wounded and over 200 soldiers taken prisoner.[7]

By the end of the conflict, the Israel Defense Forces had secured strategic positions on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts.[8]

Destroyed Israeli m60 tank in the Sinai.

Egypt emerged with renewed national pride, having successfully crossed the Suez Canal and breached the Bar-Lev Line.[9] In contrast, the war deeply shook Israeli society. The surprise attack, high casualties, and early setbacks shattered the national sense of military invincibility established after the Six-Day War and severely damaged Israel’s image of deterrence.[10]

While maintaining his longstanding view that the war had been preventable, the Rebbe, in a letter written in November 1973, emphasized that the Yom Kippur War had been marked by clear and extraordinary miracles:

Here I wish to refer to one point in your latest letter, where you wrote about the difference between the Six Day War and the so-called Yom Kippur War, in that G‑d’s miracles were more obvious in the Six Day War, etc.
As a matter of fact, there were ample miracles, and quite obvious ones, in the last war. The overall miracle, which has now been revealed, although not overly publicized, is the survival after the first few days of the war, when even Washington was seriously concerned whether the Israeli army could halt the tremendous onslaught of the first attack. Slowly and gradually some details are now being revealed also in the Israeli press as to how serious was the danger in those early days of the war. [. . .]
There are also scores of reported miracles in various sectors of both fronts, which need not be recounted here.
The essential point of this whole tragic war is that it could have been prevented, and, as in the case of medicine, prevention is more desirable than cure.[11]

Agranat Commission

On November 18, 1973, the government established the Agranat Commission to investigate the failures of the war.[12] The Rebbe anticipated that the commission, having been created by the political leadership, would not be as critical of it while placing the bulk of the blame on the military.[13]

The commission ultimately did so, assigning responsibility to the military echelon, recommending the dismissal of IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar, absolving Defense Minister Moshe Dayan of wrongdoing, and commending Prime Minister Golda Meir’s conduct.[14] Elazar resigned, but maintained that he had been wrongly blamed for matters that were the responsibility of the government, particularly Dayan. Many Israelis agreed, viewing him as a scapegoat, and the backlash ultimately led to Meir’s resignation in April 1974.[15]

Economically, the war ushered in a “lost decade” marked by inflation soaring from 12% to 500% over ten years and a plunge in annual GDP growth rates from nearly 12% to around 3%.[16]

The peace talks that followed resulted in the eventual decision to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, a move that the Rebbe regarded as a long-term strategic blunder that led to massive security shortcomings, conflicts on other fronts, and hundreds of deaths in its first years.[17][18] In contrast, he considered the retention of the Golan Heights a necessary and positive outcome due to its strategic importance to Israel’s security.[19]

Other Mentions

List additional letters, Sichos, etc., from the Rebbe on this subject, with links

Further Reading

Here list other related books, articles, etc.

References

  1. ↑ U.S. DOS Middle East Task Force Situation Report #66 — Oct. 26, 1973; Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (New York: Da Capo, 1992), 568; President Nixon Press Conference — October 26, 1973; Yom Kippur War — Encyclopedia Britannica.
  2. ↑ “Hatasha BaTzafon: Milchamat HaHatasha Mul Suriya Bein Hafsakat HaEsh LeVein Hafradat HaKochot, 1973–1974” [in Hebrew], Ran Shamai, (July 5, 2023); “Yom Kippur A Quiet Day In the Golan.” New York Times, September 27, 1974; “Kissinger Delivers List of Syria’s Israeli POWs,” Center for Israel Education; Jonathan B. A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 398.
  3. ↑ “The issue of the Israeli POWs in Syria,” Israel State Archives; “At Least 86 Israeli POWs Were Killed in 1973 War, New Documents Reveal.” Haaretz, September 24, 2013; Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to Investigate Allegations of Ill Treatment and Torture, 10–24 October 1974 (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1975), 11–19; “Israel and Egypt report an agreement to initiate P.O.W. exchange at once.” New York Times, November 15, 1973.
  4. ↑ Address, 19 Iyar, 5734. Toras Menachem vol. 76 pp. 142-143; Sichos Kodesh vol. 2 p. 106.
  5. ↑ Background — UNDOF.
  6. ↑ Lopsided Prisoner Exchanges — HonestReporting; “Joyful Outbursts Mark Homecomings of Injured Israeli and Syrian P.O.W.'s.” New York Times, June 2, 1974; First prisoners of war return home from Syria — Video.
  7. ↑ Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 497. “Enigma: The Anatomy of Israel’s Intelligence Failure Almost 45 Years Ago,” Bruce Riedel, Brookings, September 25, 2017; “When Freed After Yom Kippur War, Israeli PoWs Railed at Army, Transcripts Show.” Times of Israel, September 15, 2021; Prisoners-of-War and Hostages Exchanges — Jewish Virtual Library.
  8. ↑ Yom Kippur War — History.com; “‘The next days were hell’: how the Yom Kippur war realigned the Middle East.” The Guardian, October 1, 2023.
  9. ↑ Yom Kippur War — History.com; “The Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars in Historical Context,” Harry Booty, E-International Relations, (March 27, 2012); Oct. 6, Egyptian Armed Forces Day — Office Holidays.
  10. ↑ “The Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars in Historical Context,” Harry Booty, E-International Relations, (March 27, 2012); “How the Yom Kippur War Changed Israel.” TIME, October 11, 2023; “‘The next days were hell’: how the Yom Kippur war realigned the Middle East.” The Guardian, October 1, 2023.
  11. ↑ Letter, 16 Cheshvan, 5734.
  12. ↑ IDF & Defense Establishment Archives — Agranat Committee.
  13. ↑ Shalom Yerushalmi, Yossi Elitov, and Aryeh Ehrlich, Berega Ha’emet [in Hebrew] (Modi’in, Israel: Dvir, 2017), 197.
  14. ↑ “Elazar, Chief of Staff, Quits Golda Meir Exonerated by War Inquiry Board.” San Francisco Jewish Bulletin, April 5, 1974.
  15. ↑ “Gen. David Elazar Dead; Israeli Chief in 1973 War.” New York Times, April 16, 1976; The Agranat Commission — Jewish Virtual Library; Yom Kippur War — History.com; “‘The next days were hell’: how the Yom Kippur war realigned the Middle East.” The Guardian, October 1, 2023.
  16. ↑ Israeli Economy — Center for Israel Education; Israel Business & Economy: The Rise & Fall of Inflation — Jewish Virtual Library.
  17. ↑ Address, 3 Teves, 5746. Toras Menachem, 5746 vol 2 p 227, Video, Audio.
  18. ↑ Yom Kippur War — History.com; “How the Yom Kippur War Changed Israel.” TIME, October 11, 2023; “‘The next days were hell’: how the Yom Kippur war realigned the Middle East.” The Guardian, October 1,
  19. ↑ Letter, Third Light of Chanukah, 5741, p. 1.
Retrieved from "https://jem.teq.wiki/w/index.php?title=Aftermath_of_the_Yom_Kippur_War_1974&oldid=1088"